The majority reasons, penned by Abella J, decide that a hyperlink, without more, should never be seen as publication of the contents to which it refers. A number of reasons are given, but the essence is that hyperlinks may be inserted without knowledge of the operator of the site containing the secondary article, and that site's content can be changed any time by whoever controls the secondary page. In other words, linkers may link to content that may not initially be defamatory, but that may become so because creation and development of the secondary site lies in the hands of the party controlling that site. Abella J would require the hyperlinker to actually repeat the secondary page comments in order for there to be a "publication."

The concurring reasons by McLachlin CJ and Fish J agree in part with this, but propose a test that would have the hyperlinker adopt or endorse the content of the hyperlinked text. On applying this test to the facts, there was also no "publication."

The further concurring reasons by Deschamps J, which actually take up most of the decision, go into quite a bit more depth. Deschamps J distinguishes shallow and deep links, for instance, and finds that the deep-linked article was readily available to readers and that the first requirement of publication was satisfied in this case. However, she held that there was insufficient evidence as to whether the allegedly defamatory information had been brought to the knowledge of some third person. Like the other judges, she thought there should be no presumption that just because a link existed, this meant that someone had clicked on it and read the secondary article. In this case, the deep link was one of seven links on the primary page, and evidence of the number of hits on the article alone would not be very helpful to the trier of fact. Finally, Deschamps J noted that the defendant might have had a defence based on the fact that the articles arguably raised matters of public interest.